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Abstract: 
Whilein this twenty-first Century (XXIe), questionsare risingaboutthebanking system 
governance andthe "post-crisis governance reforms", it is usefulto revisitthe founding 
debatesof thegovernanceof the twentieth century (XXe).In this area, traditionally, wefollow 
Berle and Means (1932) by tracing separation betweenshareholders andmanagers. 
However, Adam Smith‟s banking system view already highlighted the importance of strategic 
choice of bank executives (risk) in the emergence of crisis phenomena. These strategic choices 
refer tothe relationship betweenshareholders and managers.From his analysis, one can safely 
conclude that the way in which „Ayr‟ bank is managed, that is the role of its governance, 
constitutes a key determinant of the excessive risk and the fragility of this bank. Specifically, 
we show that the dispersedAyr bank‟s ownership structure, the asymmetric information 
between Board and Shareholders and  the lack of directors expertise and independence  for 
inuring transparency  increased both the bank‟s risk taking and its fragility. 
The regulation issue of the banks activityisat the heart ofSmith‟sbanking theory. Itfinds an 
echo incontroversies over reportsof credit andcurrency issuesin the19th century.Smith‟s 
supporttobanking regulationseems to have beenaresponse to the 1772 Scottish bank 
crisisunderstood asthe first modernbanking crisis.In Smith‟s opinion, the banks should be 
regulated to ensure the correct reflux of credit currency and avoiding an excessive 
transformation risk. 
 
JEL:B1, B12, B26, G21, G3. 
Key-words:bank governance and regulation, Ayr crisis, risk taking behavior, 
financialfragility, transformation risk, credit and currency issues. 
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“Unlike the natural sciences in  which the last state of 
knowledge is sufficient to himself, it‟s never unnecessarily 
well  Moreover, it is always pertinent-  in economy to refer 
to the founders, to  recalled the genesis of concepts, to 
identify the mode of development of  theories, to reveal 
their configurations, even contradictions”. 
Hubert BROCHIER, presentation of economicthought, Mark BLAUG, 
Economica, 1981. 
 
 
 
0. Introduction  
After the 2008-2010 international bank crisis and the still current threat of new crisis, 
coming back to theAdam Smith‟sbanking system, initiated in « An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations»,(Adam Smith (1996-1776)), brings new lights about the 
importance of banks‟ governance in the outbreak of crisis and the necessity of having a close 
control on it. Hence, beyond the historical perspective,A. Smith‟s contribution deserves to 
beread (orre-read)asrisingissues related torisk andbank governance.This presents 
theadvantage of givingahistoricalbasis for banking governance analysis andclarifying the 
building foundation of contemporary thinking.Choosing Smith‟s conception explains by the 
clear and very up-to-date analysis he brought to the comprehension of 
financialfragility,governance structure, andbanking regulationintheemergence of bankcrises. 
Smith is the founding father of the modern banking theory, indeed, from Smith‟s 
writings(1996-1776), literature showed that contemporary debatesare rootedin classicaltexts, 
for instance, David Glasner (1992), Laidler (1981), Mints (1945), Perlman (1989) or still 
Santiago-Valiente (1988), and Selgin (1988), Selgin (1989). A depth reading of the Smith‟s 
contribution strikes by his full understandingof the roots ofmodernbankingsystems.Indeed,the 
"Smithian" banking system has all the characteristicsof a modernbanking one.His 
analysisrevealed some deepproximity with thecontemporaneous bankingcrises. More 
precisely, Smith's analysisfocused on the“Ayr Bank" failure which is the first modernbanking 
crisisfaced bythe Bank of England (Andreades(1966, 157)).Indeed, in several respects, 
thisbankruptcylooks likethe 2007-2008 World crisis(Rockoff(2009)). This failureis an 
illustration ofa bankimbalance, wheretherisk governanceplayedan obvious key role. This is 
the point on which we will particularly focus.  
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Hence, followingSmith,the way in whichbanksare managed(closely related to the 
governance of banks) is a key factor in the developmentof currency and 
bankingcrises.Although Smith does not explicitly use the term, thebanks‟governance appears 
as the determinant factorin excessive risktaking andthe correlatedbanks‟fragility.To show 
this,Smithopposestwotypes of banks: the first oneswhich adoptsound management 
practicesand the second ones that acceptmore riskymanagementpractices(asthe Ayr bank that 
he makes his case study). 
At the time of Smith's writings,the banking system already knew the 
fundamentalsound management rules.Mainly, these are the maturity rules (inflows and 
outflows synchronization), prudential regulations(including those of the real bills) and the 
financing Rule that should not exceed the circulating capital value.  However, fully aware, 
some banks deliberately violated them by taking excessive risks. In this regard,the above 
factors motivate a new readingof Smith‟s writings. To our knowledgethis is the 
firstresearchthat showed therole of banks governance, whichis a newtheme inthebankruptcy of 
the bank"Ayr" in 1772. 
The paper is divided into five sections. A first section shows that his bank credit approach is 
relatively autonomous from his monetary views exposed in the chapter IV of book one on 
the”Origine and Use of money”. This highlights the importance of the credit system in the 
process of emergence of crises.Afterwards, we set out the steps of the Ayr bank failure in a 
section 2. Weanalyses the behavior of the Ayr bank‟s governance as a crisis factorin  section 
3. Smith's analysis of the failure of the bank "Ayr" is understood as an illustration of the non-
neutrality of the banking system. From his analysis, one can safely conclude that the way in 
which „Ayr‟ bank is managed, that is the role of its governance, constitutes a key determinant 
of the excessive risk and the fragility of this bank. In section 4, we examine the modernity of 
the Smith‟s banking principle. Section five establishes the relationships between the micro 
and the macro level: in Smith‟s opinion, the banks should be regulated to ensure the correct 
reflux of credit currency and avoiding an excessive transformation risk.From the whole paper, 
it‟s concluded that,already, in his timeSmith had a clear idea about the causes of crises by 
putting into evidence the role of governance as a main risk factor. 
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1.  The“Smithian”banking system from neutrality to non-neutrality 
Smithdistinguishes twoantagonistic views on monetaryand credit theories.Each one 
illustrates a particulardesign of thebanking system and its role in the money creation process. 
- The first approachis related toSmith‟s value theory1and it intended toexplain the prices 
formation
2
.This is a classicapproach in which moneyplays no role (the so-called “veil 
role”)3. It is the way that follows the quantitative theory of money and credit. It insists 
on the neutrality of money which role is reduced making easier the real exchanges.The 
result of thisfirstapproach is thatthe banks‟governance (if following the rulesof good 
management
4
), playsno roleand cannot presentany kind of risk factor.Good 
management involves respecting mainly the “rule of convertibility” that guarantees the 
banking system neutrality. Hence, the banks should respect the equality between their 
issue of paper currency and the value of gold and silver money. Consequently, the 
notes holders must be sure that their notes are convertible into gold and silver money 
at any time. He highlights the risks of non-compliance with the rule of convertibility 
by banks and illustrates this by referring to the behavior of banks (excess emission) 
which created problems that had to be regulated by the Scottish Parliament. 
On the contrary, banks have contributed a great deal to the economic growth: 
“Whether the trade, either of Scotland in general, or of the city of Glasgow in 
particular, has really increased in so great a proportion, during so short a period, I 
do notpretend to know. If either of them has increased in this proportion, it seems to 
be an effect too great to be accounted for by the sole operation (i.e banking 
operations) of this cause.”(Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit., P.297) 
- On the contrary, in the chapter II of book II of the Wealth of Nations, he develops a 
quite opposite view about the role of the banking system as a potential source of 
currency instability. Here, the currency is based on the private creation ofbank credit. 
The emergence of crises is a consequence of the lack of control of this private money 
                                                          
1
 Smith distinguishes two types of value; the use value and exchange value. The use value of something is its 
usefulness; the exchange value is its price A. Smith(1996-1776, Book one, chapters 1 to 7). 
2
 Smith value theory necessitates that long term price formation be governed by the relative cost of production of 
metals and final commodities. 
3
 For substantially all classic economists (Smith, Ricardo, Say..), except Malthus, currency plays a neutral role in 
the economy ("currency is a veil," according to Jean-Baptiste Say). This means that since it is useless by itself, 
there is no advantage in keeping it; its only interest is to be exchanged against other good (purchase of consumer 
goods) or investment. 
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emission (the Scottish banking crisis of 1772). Hence, the banking system is not 
neutral. 
While the firstapproach illustratesthe neutrality of thebanking system,the 
secondemphasizes theimportanceof the credit systeminthegrowing risksand the emergence 
ofcrises.Smith's analysis of thefailure of the bank"Ayr"
5
is an illustration ofthenon-neutrality 
of the bankingsystem. “In the long-run, therefore, the operations of this bank increased the 
real distress of the country, which it meant to relieve; and effectually relieved, from a very 
great distress, those rivals whom it meant to supplant.‟‟. (Adam Smith (1996-1776, 
op.cit.,p.315) 
This approach shows that Smith changed his mind about the dangers of currency and 
bank-notes. Indeed, many modifications have affected the Scottish banking sector between 
1763 and 1772. These structural changes could have influenced the Smith‟s thinking about the 
risk of emergence of a banking crisis.Furthermore, the 1772‟s crisis associated to the 
bankruptcy of the Ayr‟s bank remains the most convincing factor that explains Smith‟s 
change of opinion (see for instanceCheckland(1975b) andGherity(1994)). The optimistic view 
ofthe bank that Smith defendshas been modified bya series of shocksthat hit 
theScottishbanking systeminthe past decade.“…..the decisive event in reshaping Smith‟s 
thinking about banking, I believe, was the failure of the Ayr Bank (Douglas, Heron, and 
Company) and more generally what became known as the Crisis of 1772”. Rockoff (2009) 
The present paper inspires from these works,however, it specifically focus on the role 
of the erratic governance of this bank as anexplanation factor in the emergence of thecrisis. It 
underlines that Smith‟s analysis of the 1772 crisis insisted on the role of shareholders and the 
risk taking position as a determinant factor in the crunchoccurrence. This point constitutes our 
added value to the current analysis of the Smith‟s views on the Banking system.  
Currently, the question of the role of the banking system in the macroeconomic 
balance is at the heart of our concerns. This corresponds to abandon the paradigm of a neutral 
financial system, which has no effect on the real sector as for instance exemplified it the 
Modigliani-Miller‟s theorem 6 (1958). At this stage,it should be notedthat this issueis not 
                                                          
5
Ayr crisis was international in scope, effecting London, Edinburgh, Europe, and the Americas. 
6
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem is one of the fundamental theorems of modern corporate finance. It 
was the starting point for the analysis of the company's financial structure. It stipulates that in the absence of 
taxes  and in the presence of efficient financial system, the financial structure has no influence on the company's 
value. 
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newanditdates back to theeighteenth and nineteenth.Atthistime, thedebate
7
focused on the 
roleof the banking systemand the link betweenbank moneyand creditand its effect 
oneconomic cycles. 
According to Smith, the supply of bank credit, as private money emission, plays an 
essential role in the economyenrichment process. However, the safety of exchange involves 
that, at any time, the banks should select and monitor the borrowers‟ credit risk. Thanks to 
their ability to assess the risks or bad speculations (if well managed), the banks lie in the very 
heart of the mechanism that allows both the regulation of the quantity of money and the 
efficient capital allocation at the macro level. However, both of them may be subject to 
external shocks and may be unable reducing information asymmetries
8
. 
In this regard, the banks should not be mere financial intermediaries: loans create 
deposits. He opposes thus the classic banking theory, which limits the activity of banks just to 
those deposit banks, granting loans from the deposits received from savings agents.This view 
deeply influenced the founder of the “Banking Principle”,Thomas Tooke. Indeed, the link 
between money and credit is also analyzed in the writings of T. Tooke, one of the proponents 
of the school of banking (Tooke (1838-1857), Tooke(1844), Viner (1937),and Mondello 
(1985). Tooke has a broad view of monetary instruments. He takes into account all forms of 
"paper credit". “Why distinguish between notes and other forms of credit money, all of which 
perform the functions of payment instruments",T.Tooke. Hence, Tooke said that all 
movements of capital do not require effective paymentsincoins or notes, but 
 meltbybankcredit operations. According to Tooke, it is not in the power of banks to directly 
add notes to the amount flowing. There can be no excess emission of money because the 
money supply is determined by the demand for credit and notes that economic agents did not 
want to hold returned to the banks.Thus, for Tooke, credit supply is the causal variable of 
currency issue and various payments instruments and best accounts of the banks activities. 
Consequently, banking crises are not due to the excess emission and non-compliance with the 
rule of reserves, but rather due to non-respect of the rule of risk-taking that is the root cause, 
i.e. the degree of safety and liquidity offered by the securities serve as collateral in bank loans. 
But in any monetary system, even with full convertibility and reserve ratio to 100 per cent, the 
                                                          
7
The relationship between the bank money and credit brings out the contrast between two conceptions of the 
bank; either a bank that transforms existing reserves in bank money or a bank that creates money from bank 
credit. 
8
In the assets of a bank, there is an information asymmetry between banks and their borrowers. They do not have 
all the information on the risks related to such borrower, which may lead to mechanisms of adverse selection and 
credit rationing. 
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credit may be granted recklessly, it is not guaranteed against illusory expectations and 
reversals that follow, creating insolvency of borrowers and banks. 
All monetary circulation disorders are the result of issuer default or illiquidity of their 
assets, in any case of their mismanagement. If banks are reckless and misjudge the credit risk, 
there will be no reflux, no loan reimbursement, and therefore probably excess emission of 
currency related to excess credit.The insolvency of a bank and its failure can cause doubts 
among depositors of other banks, anda liquidity crisiscan be added toa solvency crisis.Thus, 
the causes of banking crises seem to be related to other mechanisms and cannot be avoided 
only by the rule concerning the volume of reserves. Because banking crises are related to the 
activity of credit in the form of multiplication of deposits. 
Previous developments of subsequent authors to Smith illustrate how this author was a 
pioneer in the study of banking risks. 
2. The Steps of the Ayr Bank Failure 
According to Tyler Beck Goodspeed (2014):“The 1772 financial crisis should concern 
us because it was not simply a minor, run-of-the-mill regional banking panic, but rather a 
full-blown global financial crisis”.The bankruptcy of Ayr Bank (real name Douglas, Heron 
Co.) is famous for two reasons, on the one hand, it inaugurated the first financial crisis of the 
modern era and, on the other hand, it is the cause of the drastic revision of the Smith‟s 
monetary theory as mentioned in the first part of our contribution. Numerous contributions 
analyzed this banking, financial and economic crisis. For instance, it includes the relatively 
old studies of Kerr (1908), Hamilton (1956), Munn (1981), Checkland (1975) and the more 
recent ones as Rockoff (2011), (2009) and (2013). Then how, in few words, do we capture the 
importance of the Ayr Bank collapse for Smith‟s thought? In fact, unlike the commentators, 
Smith is much more focused on an analysis of the causes of the failure of Douglas, Heron & 
Co than to give a factual description of the steps that lead the bank to bankruptcy (see 
Hueckel (2009)). Kosmetatos (2014) and previously Hamilton (1956) and Saville (1996) 
accurately describe the bankruptcy process. Hamilton (1956, p.408) (as Smith), said that the 
Ayr Bank was founded in 1769 to remedy a lack of 'working capital' and not for speculative 
reasons. The banking crisis of which Ayr was the victim results from endogenous causes 
related to economic development as its governance did not reveal able to control and not, as 
was the case previously and later, to exogenous causes related to continental conflicts (Seven 
Years War (1756 -1763), revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars). It seems that two root causes 
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are responsible for this failure. On the one hand the bank made too many commitments by 
funding long-term activities without ensuring a correct short term hedging and, on the other 
hand, some of its customers, ventured into speculative activities. 
If the purpose of the Ayr Bank creation was to secure activities in the long run, it is 
necessary to say that the immediate behavior of its directors led to miss the goal. Indeed, as 
Saville mentioned it (Saville 1996, p.156), they “attracted persons primarily interested in 
speculation and bill discounts”. More precisely, the Ayr bank‟s directors involved themselves 
in the commercial activities of specialized firms in foreign and domestic trade. As Saville 
(1996, p.155), Rockoff (2009) mentioned it, the directors granted each other cash accounts 
and guarantees. Furthermore, they organized a bill trade that promoted mutual credit. This 
involved the creation of private credit money that needed periodical clearing for guaranteeing 
the solvency of the emitted bills and the cash account of the owners. A first warning appeared 
during the 1769-1770 year, indeed, facing the huge amount of Ayr‟s credit money, the Bank 
of Scotland withdrew its caution and refused to draw bank notes against Ayr‟s bills 
(particularly to the Earl of Dumfries). To replenish its reserves, Ayr began to draw bills of 
exchange on London at 8% making the Bank of London, a lender of last resort. However, 
these loans were made at the rate of 5%: it can be described as a machine that generates 
losses. “... it was paying, in the way of interest and commission, upwards of eight per cent. 
and was consequently losing more than three per cent. upon more than three fourths of all its 
dealings „‟. (Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit., p. 314)).However, in 1771, the necessity to 
develop the Scottish activity involved the Bank of Scotland to renew its confidence in the Ayr 
bank and allowed its further emission by again accepting its bills.  It followed a tremendous 
increase of Ayr‟s note at fifty days payable to Bank of Scotland due both the bank itself but 
also to some of its local partners. The Bank of Scotland at the time offered to accept the notes 
of the three largest Glasgow banks. The Scottish notes presented the specificity of a very short 
term schedule and the debtor that was reluctant to honor the payment was induced to pay a 
5% interest charge. Douglas & Heron increased still its debt to the Bank of Scotland by 
borrowing it gold species (£15,000). This increased the fragility of the Scottish payment 
system. Hence, in spite of emission facilities offered to London, on 10 June as Saville(1996, 
p.156) reports it, the merchant Alexander Fordyce saw its bills on Heron rejected. The 
speculative mechanism was the following. Fordyce created the Neal, James, Fordyce and 
Down was a London bank that short selled huge amount of commodities in East India 
Company and this bank was heavily indebted near Douglas and Heron. The Bank of England 
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refused a bill drawn on Amsterdam. Then, this involved a chain of default banking. In a few 
days, 22 Scottish banks failed and the bank run spread all over Europe generating illiquidity 
for more than one year. 
On June 22 of this year, the Ayr Bank was forced to stop payment on its notes. In a 
letter to Adam Smith on June 27, David Hume wrote that “We are here in a very melancholy 
Situation: Continual Bankruptcies, universal Loss of Credit, and endless Suspicions... The 
Carron Company is reeling, which is one of the greatest Calamities of the whole, as they gave 
Employment to near 10,000 People”. 
Goodspeed (2014) shows that, in both 1772 and 1773, the total number of British 
bankruptcies highly exceeds the average rate of usual failures of the eighteenth century. The 
following figure drawn from Goodspeed illustrates it. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the rate of British bankruptcies from 1700 to 1780 (sources Goodspeed 
op. cit. p. 23).  
In spite of the promise to pay notes in full and the reopening of the bank, and the help 
of the Bank of England on January 1773, the bank Ayr‟s owners decided to wind it up on 
August 1773. 
3. Features of the Ayr Bank’s  “bad” governance 
This section examines the impact of weaknesses and failures of corporate governance 
mechanisms in the Ayr bank which have led to the 1772 crisis.  The Ayr bank crisis presents a 
poignant illustration of what happens when corporate governance is weak and when the 
checks and balance are ineffective. Indeed, in our opinion, the failure of corporate governance 
mechanisms in Ayr bank is the main factor inducing excessive risk taking and the bank 
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bankruptcy. Smith has been intimately involved in the AYR Bank‟s bankruptcy. The young 
Duke of Buccleuch with who Smith traveled with as a consultant and his tutor, was a Bank 
Ayr‟s director. The Duke was probably one of the people who Smith was trying to get out of 
the mess (Ross 1995, 242). The behavior of the Ayr BANK‟s leaders is an illustration of what 
Smith defines as "an accident that users of paper money are exposed due to the awkwardness 
of the conductors (bank officers)." (Rockoff, H 2009). 
Following Smith, the Ayr bank specific management mainly explains the 
bank‟sfailure. Obviously, Smith does not use the terms of “management” or “bank 
governance”, however, his description of how the bank‟s board run it to bankruptcy clearly 
corresponds to its involvement in the bank brittleness or fragility. To show this, Smith 
opposes two types of banks: the first ones adopt safe (low risky)practices while the other ones 
accept more risky management practices. “All the dealers in circulating bills of exchange, 
which those other banks had become so backward in discounting, had recourse to this new 
bank, where they were received with open arms. Those other banks, therefore, were enabled 
to get very easily out of that fatal circle, from which they could not otherwise have disengaged 
themselves without incurring a considerable loss, and perhaps, too, even some degree of 
discredit‟‟.(Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit., p.315)). 
Smith analyzes the consequences for the economy of a widespread indiscriminating 
funding. In fact, he considers an informational asymmetry situation characterized by adverse 
selection effects. Indeed, it shows that if the bank decides not to discriminate projects that are 
submitted for funding, then the bad projects (risky projects) would divert funds from less 
risky projects and more assured of a refund. 
This section provides a case study focusing on the Ayr crisis as an example of 
corporate governance failure.  The most noteworthy fact is that Adam Smith pointed out in 
almost modern terms the importance of governance errors as the origin of the so-called bank 
Ayr‟s crisis.  The corporate governance mechanisms such as the function of board of 
directors, ownership structure, shareholder engagement, transparency made strong mistakes in 
certain respects.The chief executives‟ unfettered power is an obvious problem that 
characterized Ayr‟s management. “At the time of failure, fully £400,000 of £694,175 in loans 
at the Ayr, Dumfries, and Edinburgh branches were to the directors themselves and a handful 
of other partners.” (Goodspeed (2014) p 145)  The opportunistic behavior of Ayr bank chief 
executives‟ can be attributed to several factors namely a diffuse ownership structure, a board 
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of directors that lack of influence, independence which are the criteria of an effective board 
and lack of engagement of shareholders.  
Within the Ayr bank, there are numerous illustrations of unethical activity. The board 
of directors was composed of a number of people who showed to be of “poor moral 
character” and willing to conduct fraudulent activity. Saville (1996, p.156), Goodspeed 
(2014, page 145) noted that “More troubling still was the fact that many of the complicit 
directors acted as cosignatories for one another”. 
Similarly, the current global financial crisis has been attributed partly to corporate 
governance weaknesses such as inappropriate remuneration structures and inadequate systems 
of risk management and internal control, Blinder (2009). In the following, we gather several 
facts that Smith and the modern commentators noted and we challenge them to the modern 
theoretical contributions. These elements are liable to increase the bank‟s fragility.   
a. The dispersed Ayr bank’s ownership structure   
The dispersal of the bank Ayr‟s ownership structure led to excessive risk taking. 
Indeed, as, already Kerr (1908) showed it: “The number of shareholders, shortly before the 
crisis, was 241”.Considering this period, the number of owners is considerable,because on 
average, for equivalent banks, the partnership amounted to forty. The relevance of firms‟ 
ownership structure has been extensively explored in the theoretical literature. Jensen, M. and 
Meckling, W. (1976), Agrawal andMandelker (1990) et Agrawal et Knoeber  (1996) consider 
that the ownership concentration is an essential ingredient for exerting an effective managers 
control by the shareholders board. Following the signaling theory, Ross (1977) proves that the 
ownership‟s concentration helps solving the problem of information asymmetry between 
shareholders and managers. Furthermore, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) show that this 
concentration lead the managers to be more efficient because of both accrued bargaining 
power in front of managers and incentive to monitor the actions of managers. More 
accurately, concerning the bank sector, Sironi et al (2006) show that the level of concentration 
involves an improved quality of loans, low insolvency risk and low risk assets. 
Goodspeed (2014) noted “This diffuse ownership effectively spread risk over a larger 
and more diverse set of shareholders; in fact, of the sixteen banks that failed in 1772, all but 
Douglas, Heron & Co. had fewer than six partners. Of the three banks that failed in 1772 and 
inflicted losses on creditors, all three had fewer than six partners. On the other hand, 
Douglas, Heron & Co., with 226 partners, seems to have struggled to enforce managerial 
accountability, and suffered from serious deficits in shareholder oversight of elected 
directors.” Goodspeed, (2014, p.110) 
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b. The asymmetric information between Board and Shareholders  
In the aim at ensuring efficient decisions, the directors‟ board has to fulfil certain 
criteria about the size, the independence and the expertise of his members. Recently, 
followingthe recent financial crisisand otherfinancial scandals, banksRegulatorsand 
societybecamemoreawareof thepotentialconsequencesof weaknessesin boardfunction. The 
1772 Ayr crisis has exposed egregious failures of board of directors‟ function due to 
unconsciousness of his member of the extent of the risks facing their businesses and their 
inability of challenging dominant executives(“Indeed, throughout 1771 at the Edinburgh 
office, affairs were generally conducted by just three directors; two short of the required 
quorum for approving such transactions”.Goodspeed(2014, p.141). Another factor that seems 
to favor the inefficiency of Ayr bank's Board of Directors is that there is not a sufficient 
control by shareholders as noted by Goodspeed (2014, p.111) “ On the other hand, Douglas, 
Heron & Co., with 226 partners, seems to have struggled to enforce managerial 
accountability, and suffered from serious deficits in shareholder oversight of elected 
directors”. 
Or, still, 
“the company‟s two annual general meetings were in any event clearly insufficient for 
effective oversight of an enterprise with three branches, a £1.3 million balance sheet, and an 
increasingly complex web of London liabilities”.Goodspeed (2014, p.142) 
and 
« Six days later, a meeting of directors “was pretended to be held at Edinburgh,” 
comprised of just two directors, John Campbell and Archibald Cockburn, and a third 
extraordinary director. Though such a meeting, under the contract of copartnery, had no 
power to accede to such settlements as were under consideration from Fordyce, Malcolm 
&Co. and Charles Fergusson & Co., the three directors nonetheless resolved to instruct the 
firm‟s London representatives to accept the offers of 6s. 6d. and 5s.in the pound ». Goodspeed 
(2014, p.118) 
In addition, the bank made governance mistakes consisting mainly in some 
preferential treatment granted to shareholders regardless of their projects quality. 
Consequently, instead of increasing the total capital amount, the bank generously lent money 
to its shareholders: 
“A great part of the proprietors, when they paid in their first instalment, opened a 
cash-account with the bank; and the directors, thinking themselves obliged to treat their own 
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proprietors with the same liberality with which they treated all other men, allowed many of 
them to borrow upon this cash-account what they paid in upon all their subsequent 
instalments”. (Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit., p. 313)). 
We should consider also: 
“But a bank which lends money, perhaps to five hundred different people, the greater 
part of whom its directors can know very little about, is not likely to be more judicious in the 
choice of its debtors than a private person who lends out his money among a few people 
whom he knows, and in whose sober and frugal conduct he thinks he has good reason to 
confide”. (Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit., p. 316)). 
 
c. A lack of director’s independance   
It seems that deficiencies in the non-executive director have contributed to the collapse 
of Ayr bank. The Ayr crisis focused attention on problems that can occur when the 
independence of members of the Board is compromised through the conflicts of interest. In 
terms of the disciplinary approach, independent directors should reduce conflicts of interest 
between the managers and shareholders. “Though company bylaws also prohibited more than 
one director at any office from simultaneously being a current member of any trading 
company, at Ayr that rule was violated from the start, with most of the directors, and even the 
cashier, being “deeply connected with, and concerned in” one or more Ayr trading 
companies, on whom they lavished generous credits”.Goodspeed (2014, p.141) 
An independent board (dominated by outside directors) is able to handle board 
responsibilities, help to protect shareholders from CEOs‟ opportunism and remove the 
influence of CEO power (Fama and Jensen, 1983), Horstmeyer (2014). 
d. A lack of directors expertise for insuring transparency 
Another feature of Ayr bank board that promoted high-risk practices is the lack of 
competence of those directorsas described Goodspeed (2014,p.142) “As the bank‟s balance 
sheet rapidly ballooned, directors at one office were hence frequently called upon to approve 
transactions at other offices about which they often had little or no direct knowledge”.  
In this sense, Hashagen et al. (2009) noted that the risk of poor governance and lack of 
risk management expertise in the boards are the main determinants of the recent crisis.The 
weak disclosure of information is an obvious problem that characterized Ayr‟s management. 
Shareholders do not have access to information to assess their risk taken by the bank and 
which are not active in the bank's strategy.Following Solomon (2010) “transparency is an 
essential ingredient for a sound system of corporate governance”.page 
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In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Turner Review (2009) focused on the causal 
factors arising within banks and raised a series of issues where it was felt that banks needed to 
improve their risk management and governance including the need for shareholders to make a 
more active and effective and effective interest in corporate strategy. “The flow of information 
from directors to the proprietors of the company, especially, appears to have been wholly 
inadequate for the scale and risk of transactions undertaken”.Goodspeed (2014,p.141) 
“And, having “no opportunity of being informed about their affairs, from any other 
quarter than the report of their Directors,” nor possibility of making “any useful 
investigation at a general meeting,” the proprietors were thus largely reduced to a rubber 
stamp body”.Goodspeed (2014,p.142) 
“While Lamoreaux has demonstrated that insider lending can mitigate the problem of 
asymmetric information by clarifying the enterprises with which particular banks were 
especially involved, in the case of Douglas, Heron & Co. both the nature and extent of insider 
lending was wholly unknown to the majority of the company‟s shareholders” 
Goodspeed(2014,p.142) 
Meanwhile the capital had been increased beyond the originally designed £150,000, 
the old directors were regularly re-elected, and affairs went on in the usual way”. Kerr (1908, 
chap. 9). 
In terms of the modern governance theory, this is understood as an essentially 
shareholder focus vision. In other words, the new bank‟s commitments were excessively high 
compared to its own resources.  
"From the beginning, this bank cash was badly provided. Capital shareholders set by 
two different subscriptions would be increased to the sum of 160.000 books; but, funds 
effectively did not exceed 80% of that amount; their level was higher than these shareholders‟ 
resources (though significant) to found themselves mortgaged quickly" (Adam Smith (1996-
1776, tII,op.cit., p. 550)).  
4. The modernity of the Smith’s "bankingprinciple" 
A few years before the publication of the “Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations”, Adam Smith witnessed a financial bubble bursting. This last onedecimated the 
Edinburgh banking system: amongthree banks survived among thegenuine thirty regional 
ones. According him, left to the market forces alone, finance created by private banksmay 
cause grave risk to society.Adam Smith expressly states that the free and competitive market 
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logic should not extend to the financial sphere(Carlson (1999, p.8)) notified it. Smith justifies 
the conflict between his support of bank regulation and his principle of natural liberty through 
the fact that fully free banking systemcan jeopardize monetary stability. Thus, he advocatesa 
financial exception to the principle of natural liberty and the need for strict regulatory 
framework. According to Smith, controlling the banks activity is a means of protecting 
society from the risks that the unwise running of banks could generate.Smith advocated four 
restrictions on the free banking: 
 (1) The necessity to adopt a reasonable usury law, 
 (2) The prohibition of the option clause in the bank notes emission,  
(3) The adoption of the real bills doctrine as part of the culture of banking, and, 
(4) The prohibition of notes in denominations below £5.    
Hence, followingPichet (2003), Adam Smith supportsa kind of supervision or control 
of banks. Hence,competitive market logic cannot extend to the financial sector because its 
complete freedom will result in economic and social crises. The question asked by Smith is 
how banks can avoid making excess credits. To do this, against all odds, Smith does not 
suggest proportioningcredits to the amount of gold and silver held by the bank (rule which 
fully stressed), but Smith rather pictures a commitment system very close in its feature to 
modern practice. 
Indeed, the banks play a central role at the micro level whenmanaging the solvency 
risk.This role consists in assessing the creditworthiness of debtors who are the main linkof 
akind of mechanism that allows both regulating the quantity of money and the efficient 
allocation of capital at the macro level. Infact, he considers that over time, theloansgrantedare 
not greater than the repayments made. He pictures it by the example of a basin that only 
empties or fills keeping the same level in so far as the quantity of water that fills the basin is 
equal to the outflow. Putting it otherwise, over time, the loans are no more important than the 
repayments.In this regard, the Bank is required to properly manage the risk of solvency by 
checking, whether at short term, the borrower‟s refunds amount equals the cash in advances 
that the bank supplied. It is a flux and reflux conception of credit bank money. Smith favors 
the rule of short-term loan. Hence, he excludes thus, thetime delays risk factor that could 
involve a transformation risk from short-terms loans to long run commitments. After having 
granted the short-term loan, the bank can observe the movements of the account and retrieve 
information on their ability to repay and on the creditworthiness of its borrowers. The 
fundamental banks life purpose is jointly producing credits and currency and, by their 
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expertise, reducing information asymmetries. This point is echoed by contemporary authors 
such as Fama (Fama, 1985, p. 37). 
The above considerations join the proposals of contemporary banking reforms
9
that 
consider the necessity ofremoving the transformation risk that consists in converting short 
term loans into long term credits. The objective of these reforms is to reduce the liquidity risk 
of banks, the most radical way to solve this problem is to act directly on the risk of maturity 
transformation and consideration might be given to prohibiting the banks who manage the 
deposits of grant long-term credits. This involves dividing the banking sector between banks 
whose activities that only managethe means of payment and short duration loans, while the 
others would finance long term investments. The formers‟issue would be done bydeposits 
(liabilities) covered only by securities or short-term loans. While, concerning the latters, the 
long-term loans would bethe mission of different banks issuing long-term securities. 
Currently, following the recent financial crisis, several arguments are in favor of the 
separation of activities. The first argument is based on the idea that the bank market activity 
undermines those banks and thus greatly increases the instability of the banking system 
(Hervé, A, 2013). A second argument states that combining activities exacerbate moral hazard 
created by deposit insurance and lender of last resort (IMF, 2011) because it is easier to 
takeexcessive risk in market activities than in the credit activities. This separation is also 
justified by the fact that it allows the investment banks to fail. (SeeDumontaux and Pop 
(2011)). 
Hence, Smith defines a prudential rule that consists in making frequent and regular 
discount operations that allow the banks to assess the debtors‟ solvency. Furthermore, the 
banks would observe with the greatest attention the amount of repayments compared to the 
level of advances that they previously made. 
“The frequency, regularity, and amount of his repayments, would sufficiently 
demonstrate that the amount of their advances had at no time exceeded that part of his capital 
which he would otherwise have been obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready money, 
                                                          
9
In line with international debate, as at European level (committee "Vickers" Report "Liikanen"), the Law No. 
2013-672 of 26 July 2013 of separation and regulation of banking, Official Journal of the French Republic of 31 
July 2013 reformed regulatory framework of the financial and banking sector, following others reforms already 
undertaken in the United States and Great Britain, to separate banking called speculative (or linked to 
speculation or market) from deposit activities and credit. 
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for answering occasional demands; that is, for the purpose of keeping the rest of his capital in 
constant employment”(Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit., p.306)). 
So the banking system finances the short-term economic activities (working capital) 
and excludesthe fixed capital operations. Smithconsiders that the circulating capital 
determines the amount of circulating money in the economy. This view is very different from 
the traditional quantitative theory of money. Thus, Smith develops anawfully 
modernscenarioin whichbankers and their borrowers are reciprocally dependent
10
. Indeed, by 
strategically playing with asymmetric information, by successively discounting the 
bank‟scapital for financing their highly risky operations,the bank managers could cause 
bankruptcy byunintentionally violating the above prudential rules. 
These borrowers believed that the bank should provide them all the capital they 
needed for their activities:“The banks, they seem to have thought, were in honour bound to 
supply the deficiency and to provide them with all the capital which they wanted to trade 
with”. (Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit., p. 308). However, the banks denied doing so 
because they are submitted to the restrictive rule of funding only the circulating capital and 
not the whole project‟sone. However, the speculators adapted to this constraint by using the 
practice that consists in renewing the discounting of by drawing exchange bills one upon the 
other one.  
“This expedient was no other than the well-known shift of drawing and redrawing; the 
shift to which unfortunate traders have sometimes recourse, when they are upon the brink of 
bankruptcy”.Adam Smith (1996-1996-1776, op.cit., p.308).  
This highly risky practice, referred by Smith as a specious device to increase the 
circulation of private money leads to banks failure. Indeed, private bank emission can exceed 
the absorptive capacity of the economy involves an increased demand for conversion of 
private debts into money from the indebted banks that will impact their reserves in gold and 
silver. Hence, theseproject makers or rather speculators drive the bank to bear 
increasedliquidity risks.Even if not designed as such, Smith clearly refers to an information 
asymmetry that can induce banks in error.“It was a capital which those projectors had very 
artfully contrived to draw from those banks, not only without their knowledge or deliberate 
consent, but for some time, perhaps, without their having the most distant suspicion that they 
had really advanced it”. (Adam Smith (1996-1996-1776, op.cit., p.311)). 
                                                          
10
Smith distinguishes between two types of borrowers; the 'cautious' men who borrow to finance their encaise of 
transaction and the 'project-makers or speculators' with reckless projects. 
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He also pointed out that making correction is not easy because even when these banks 
realize that their commitment is too large, it is often too late. They are forced to continue to 
fund the borrower for some time. One remedy would be, if they have time, to get gradually rid 
ofrisky borrowers by tightening their lending conditions.Smith was aware of the shortfall of 
the convertibility rule as a guarantee againstemission excess
11
. Consequently, Smith provided 
anadditional good conduct rule for banks forboth maintaining their solvency and liquidity. 
This rule is referred to as "the real bills doctrine". Lloyd Mints (1945, 25) identified Smith as 
its founder by his deep understanding. However, the „real bill doctrine” is considered in the 
literature as a minor component of the Smith„s monetary theory (Perlman 1989 Gherity 1993 
and 1994), while, in the opposite,this ruleconstitutes a major component. Indeed, compliance 
with this rule by bank governance is a factor of stability of the payments system based on 
credit.Some authors such as Vickers (1975), Checkland (1975) and Santiago-Valiente (1988) 
share the idea that Smith has focused on respect for the rule of "the real bills doctrine" as an 
important tool against the excess emission. This ruleis considered bySmithas 
agoodbankbusiness rule.It involvesdiscounting only one typeof bills, the "real"drafts as 
opposed to the "shadow" drafts. 
5. Why overseeing the banks governance? 
The main criticism that Smith addresses the governance of Ayr, and beyond, concerns 
its will not choosing between long term capital financing and supporting the short duration 
monetary activities. Hence, Smith defines fundamental rules which restrict banks to their 
strict payment transactions. However, formulating this rule assumes theoretical foundations 
based on a new conception of the movement of means of payment. This one is both micro and 
macro. 
- The micro-economic foundationsof thebanks’ governanceconstraints 
ForSmith,the modern viewof money creation is the possibilityfor bankersto help the 
increasing of national wealthon the basis ofshort-term loans(cash in advance 
deposits)allocated to producers.This approachis dueto the innovation ofScottishbankerswho 
putin placea system of advancesby crediting the dealer‟scashaccount from whichhe can 
withdraw money to pay achieve itsproduction. 
                                                          
11
 According to Smith, even with full convertibility, banks are not omniscient (Gherity, 1994) and therefore over-
issue could still occur. 
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“They invented, therefore, another method of issuing their promissory notes; by 
granting what they call cash accounts, that is, by giving credit, to the extent of a certain sum 
(two or three thousand pounds for example), to any individual who could procure two persons 
of undoubted credit and good landed estate to become surety for him, that whatever money 
should be advanced to him, within the sum for which the credit had been given, should be 
repaid upon demand, together with the legal interest.” Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit.,299) 
In orderto continue,this process involvesthe repayment of advances(reflux). Thecircuit 
is describedvery accuratelybySmith: 
“The banks, when their customers apply to them for money, generally advance it to 
them in their own promissory notes. These the merchants pay away to the manufacturers for 
goods, the manufacturers to the farmers for materials and provisions, the farmers to their 
landlords for rent; the landlords repay them to the merchants for the conveniencies and 
luxuries with which they supply them, and the merchants again return them to the banks, in 
order to balance their cash accounts, or to replace what they may have borrowed of them; 
and thus almost the whole money business of the country is transacted by means of them. 
Hence, the great trade of those companies. “Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit.,p.299. 
It follows thatthe main problem forbanks is toensure the payment system sustainability 
and, consequently, the economy as a whole. The bankers‟ envisaged solution wasto require 
theircustomersa permanentreimbursement of loans(short-termreflux).According to Smith, this 
solution has two advantages:the first one is to reducethe consequences ofasymmetric 
informationbetween bankersand borrowers.Indeed,as Smithpoints out, the bank must be 
ableto gather the necessary information and ensuring a sure continuousreflux. Hence, 
lendingshort termis a way toguarantee theborrowers „solvency: 
« But a banking company, which lends money to perhaps five hundred different 
people, and of which the attention is continually occupied by objects of a very different kind, 
can have no regular information concerning the conduct and circumstances of the greater 
part of its debtors, beyond what its own books afford it. In requiring frequent and regular 
repayments from all their customers, the banking companies of Scotland had probably this 
advantage in view.»Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit.,306) 
The second benefitis ensuring the bank solvencyitselfagainst credit in 
excess.Smithcombinesthe payments security to the meansof his time, that is to say, 
heconsidersthat the frequentreflux of issued credits guarantees astrict equivalencebetween 
themeans of paymentwhich extinguisheddebt(the amounts of gold and silver), and the 
creditcommitmentfrom borrowers.It follows thatthe bankingsystem cannotengage inlong-
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termlending transactionswhich, as mentioned above,must be madeby otherinstitutions or 
otherfunding systems(bonds orloans fromindividuals (Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit., 307). 
The need to avoidexcessivecredit is notassociatedto the will of avoiding some rise in 
nominalprices asshows it the classicalquantitative theory of money.Smith‟s purposeis related 
tothe need to avoidthe emergence ofcrisespayments relatedto the inability tomeet claims.It 
should be notedthat, following Smith, the reflux rule should be imposed to thebanks‟ 
governance. Scottishbankshad adopted it to lessenthe bankruptcy risk but, the Ayr bank, 
despite its innovative designs, blurredthe message. 
- Constraining the bank’s governance for macroeconomic reasons 
Considering the microeconomic relationships does not allow understanding the deep 
roots that led Smith compelling the bank‟s governance. At the macroeconomic level, the 
monetary circulation is not a compact unit as described by the quantitative monetary theory.  
This circulation is divided into two sets: a first set concerns the consumer relationships with 
the producers (purchase-sale of consumer goods). A second set bears on the relationship of 
dealers among them and their exchange of intermediate production goods in the chain leading 
to consumption goods from production means. 
«   The circulation of every country may be considered as divided into two different 
branches; the circulation of the dealers with one another, and the circulation between the 
dealers and the consumers.”Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit.,322) 
Since the purpose of production is consumption, at the global level, the value of 
consumption goods limits the amount of capital goods traded between producers. 
“The value of the goods circulated between the different dealers never can exceed the 
value of those circulated between the dealers and the consumers; whatever is bought by the 
dealers being ultimately destined to be sold to the consumers. The circulation between the 
dealers, as it is carried on by wholesale, requires generally a pretty large sum for every 
particular transaction. “Adam Smith (1996-1776, op.cit.,322) 
This distinction allows Smith distinguishing between final payments from consumers 
to producers and deferred payments between producers. The payment of consumption goods 
allows the producers to emerge from their credit from banks and suppliers. It follows that 
consumers hold the instrument to pay the debts permanently: money. Consumer spending is 
the reflux of advances made by the banks to producers. It follows that, for a given period, 
concerning the relationship between producers, trade value cannot exceed the value of 
consumption goods. Thus, Smith explains the need to require from banks behavioral rules on 
loans that cannot exceed the level of reimbursement that they can legitimately expect. 
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“If bankers are restrained from issuing any circulating bank notes, or notes payable to 
the bearer, for less than a certain sum; and if they are subjected to the obligation of an 
immediate and unconditional payment of such bank notes as soon as presented, their trade 
may, with safety to the public, be rendered in all other respects perfectly free.”Adam Smith 
(1996-1776, op.cit.,329). 
These rules cannot be applied without limiting the capacity for action of the banks‟ 
governance that must meet specific legislation. 
6. Conclusion 
In spite of the rising of new financial and monetary technologies, the combination of 
financial innovation and deregulation that brought about rapid changes in the financial 
systems working, the necessity of prudential rules that should be adopted by any banking 
system have ever been defined three centuries ago by Adam Smith. Obviously, these rules 
must reflect the new technology specificity; however, in spirit, they do not change too much.  
Smith intrinsically associated the bank governance behavior and the respect of 
prudential rules. This means that no automatic rule, as for instance the strict observance of a 
ratio can prevent the failure of a bank. The banks‟ safety depends on the will and skill of their 
management team and their dependency from the shareholders tastes.  
Furthermore, Smith did not only define a microanalysis of the banks behavior. He 
related it to macroeconomics concerns. Hence, bounding the governance economic freedom 
by law is a necessity to avoid the global failure of the whole payment system. Indeed, 
unthoughtful behaviors from the bank governance always end in increasing the transformation 
risks. Modern banking theory and, above all practice, did not follow this obvious result. As a 
consequence, in spite of the succession of international agreement as Bale I, II and, now, III, 
the security of the global banking system is always at stake. Adopting the simple rule of 
checking the necessity of reflux of short term credit as already mentioned it Adam Smith 
could constitute a safe regulatory rule.  
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